"Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom...A long and violent abuse of power is generally the means of calling the right of it in question..."
~Thomas Paine, Common Sense
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bush. Show all posts

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Vital Interests

"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act."
~George Orwell
Introduction: Asking the Hard Questions
After realizing that our government purposefully misconstrued evidence and lied about intelligence in order to invade Iraq, one is inclined to ask the honest question, "What is the real motive behind this War? If, all along, there was no legitimate threat of WMDs, why did our government create a charade to invade Iraq, and what are the real reasons we are still occupying Iraq militarily?"
As we pointed out in our first blog post on the Iraq War, "Rumors of Wars," the argument in support of the war has changed over time (which, incidentally, is an obvious red flag to each of us). First, the threat of WMDs and nuclear proliferation were used to rally support for the invasion. Later, both political wings repeated the claim that if troops withdrew from Iraq, Muslim extremist groups would take over the region. Even critics of the war began to claim that the US had a responsibility to remain as long as necessary to repair the "problem" we had started.
These arguments in support of the continuation of the Iraq War each depended on the same remarkably illogical premise: that understanding the reasons WHY we invaded Iraq is not as important as deciding what to do now.
Such illogical reasoning eerily resembles "doublethink," a concept popularized by George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four:
"[Doublethink is] the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them...To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient...to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of the reality which one denies."
Such is the thought process of Americans who support a resolution to the War without taking into account the War's history. IF our leaders intentionally lied to us in order to invade Iraq, wouldn't the ideal scenario for them be a public that does not seek to understand the reasons we are at war? Compounding the problem, most Americans know little about the history of US involvement in the Middle East. Hence, the American public unwittingly contributes to the continuation of a War built on lies.
The American public is continually blinded by the fictitious partisan political issues which evolve from time to time, but never towards a resolution of the conflict. Even the strongest anti-war democrats have changed their rhetoric. Their current 'foreign policy' talking-point unabashedly asks the question of whether the Bush administration's 'War on Terror' focused too much on Iraq and not enough on Afghanistan, where al-Quida has supposedly regrouped. As always, the debate uses fear and confusion to mask the underlying question of WHY we are really at war. Ever distracted by the fear-mongering propagandists, the American public, in the midst of these lies, has yet to seek substantive answers to the present conflict.
A true understanding naturally comes as one seeks answers to the hard but important questions of HOW and WHY our government has lied to us. Our first Iraq War post answered the question of HOW the government has lied. As you can learn from that post, the War never had anything to do with WMDs, a tyrannical regime, freedom, or terrorism. Once you understand this, you will be ready to uncover the truth behind the lies, the real reasons WHY we are at war.
The Truth
Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton's Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, said, "Our nation uses force for one purpose alone: To protect and promote American interests." Those interests can be categorized by their level of importance: (1) Vital, (2) important, and (3) humanitarian or other interests. It logically follows then that there is or was an American interest at stake in Iraq, vital, important, or otherwise, that justified military action in the eyes of policy makers. While it was first claimed that these interests involved our national security, it has since been established by congress, the presidential committee, the United Nations, and others that there was no threat from Iraq at the time of the '03 invasion.
The vital interest at stake that demanded military action in the minds of policy makers is evident in the following statements by recent US Presidents. While this analysis could begin at an earlier date, we'll begin in 1980 with the foreign policy of Jimmy Carter and work our way to the present.
The Carter Doctrine
During the presidency of Jimmy Carter the Soviet Union, which had long been at odds with the West regarding control of Middle Eastern resources, was attempting to establish a strategic military position in the region. Regarding this issue, Jimmy Carter established what is known as the Carter Doctrine in his 1980 State of the Union address:
"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."
Notice that President Carter identifies that America has "vital interests" in the Persian Gulf region. This interest was considered so vital that the US would confront any outside force (not just terrorism from within) seeking to gain control of the region by, "any means necessary, including military force." What could be so vital to America's interest that it would merit such an aggressive policy? Carter identified this earlier in his speech:
The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil
Carter identifies the free movement of oil to be a vital interest to the United States, an interest so significant that we would maintain exclusive control of the area using military force.
The US's foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region has become more aggressive with successive Presidents, regardless of party distinctions, as demonstrated during the Reagan years.
As you read the following statements from speeches, press conferences, and official documents, keep in mind that the reasons stated for protecting the free movement of oil vary - and perhaps are never fully admitted - but the fact that OIL is and has for decades been the underlying motive for US involvement in the Middle East is undeniably clear.
The Reagan Era
During his remarks in a White House briefing on policy toward the Persian Gulf, Ronald Reagan said the following:
"In summary then, the United States and its allies maintain a presence in the Gulf to assist in the free movement of petroleum, to reassure those of our friends and allies in the region of our commitment to their peace and welfare, to ensure that freedom of navigation and other principles of international accord are respected and observed -- in short, to promote the cause of peace. Until peace is restored and there's no longer a risk to shipping in the region, particularly shipping under American protection, we must maintain an adequate presence to deter and, if necessary, to defend ourselves against any accidental attack or against any intentional attack. As Commander in Chief, it's my responsibility to make sure that we place forces in the area that are adequate to that purpose. Our goal is to seek peace rather than provocation, but our interests and those of our friends must be preserved. We're in the gulf to protect our national interests and, together with our allies, the interests of the entire Western World. Peace is at stake; our national interest is at stake. And we will not repeat the mistakes of the past. Weakness, a lack of resolve and strength, will only encourage those who seek to use the flow of oil as a tool, a weapon, to cause the American people hardship at home, incapacitate us abroad, and promote conflict and violence throughout the Middle East and the world."
Although President Reagan sugar-coated the United States' motives with the word "peace" he nevertheless makes it unmistakably clear that the reason for our presence in the Gulf is to protect our oil interests. (It should be noted that statements such as these made by Presidents and other politicians or organizations are not few and far between. Oil as the underlying motive for US intervention in the Middle East is a universally accepted fact in the political and historical realm. If anyone desires additional resources we will gladly provide them).
George H. W. Bush
The Presidency of the first President Bush is perhaps most remembered for what is known as the Gulf War or the Persian Gulf War. Iraq who was invading the neighboring country of Kuwait was seen by many in American politics as a threat to our national interests. As the invasion commenced, President Bush offered these words:
Needless to say, we view the situation with the utmost gravity. We remain committed to take whatever steps are necessary to defend our longstanding, vital interests in the Gulf, and I'm meeting this morning with my senior advisers here to consider all possible options available to us.
US forces drove back the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait and pushed the military almost all the way back to the capital city in a short period of time. Bush would later be criticized for not seizing the opportunity to dispose of Saddam Hussein who, although once hailed as an asset in the Middle East, was now considered a threat to US interests. Although many justify our intervention in the Gulf War by arguing that we were protecting the sovereignty of Kuwait, the protection of our oil interests in the Middle East as the real motive was no secret. Here is one more quote from Bush to dissipate any remaining doubt:
Immediately after the Iraqi invasion, I ordered an embargo of all trade with Iraq and, together with many other nations, announced sanctions that both freeze all Iraqi assets in this country and protected Kuwait's assets. The stakes are high. Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world. Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.
The Clinton Years
It is ironic that in the United States the Democratic Party is considered the Anti-war party whereas the Republicans are considered more prone to use military force; ironic because of the extensive amount of death and destruction that took place under the Clinton years. It should be remembered that much of the inexcusable death in Iraq that is described in our previous post "Paying the Price for the Gulf War" took place under the Clinton administration during which time Clinton also approved at least 3 major air strikes against the country. Clinton explained why he approved one of those strikes (1996) as follows:
Good morning. Today I know the thoughts and prayers of every American are with our men and women in uniform serving in the Persian Gulf, standing up for America's interests. I want to speak with you about why, 10 days ago, I ordered our Armed Forces to strike Iraq, what we have accomplished and where we go from here. America's vital interests in the Persian Gulf are constant and clear: to help protect our friends in the region against aggression, to work with others in the fight against terrorism, to preserve the free flow of oil, and to build support for a comprehensive Middle East peace. Any group or nation that threatens the stability of the region threatens those interests. For the past five years, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly threatened the stability of the Persian Gulf and our allies, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Time and again, he has lashed out recklessly against his neighbors and against his own people. America's policy has been to contain Saddam, to reduce the threat he poses to the region, and to do it in a way that makes him pay a price when he acts recklessly. That is why, when Saddam sent his troops to the Kurdish city of Urbil in Northern Iraq two weeks ago, we responded -- strongly, immediately and strategically. If we had failed to answer Saddam's provocation, he would have been emboldened to act even more recklessly and in a manner more dangerous to our interests. That is why we did respond and why we did so in a way that made our interests more secure. We acted in Southern Iraq, where our interests are the most vital and where we had the capacity to increase the international community's ability to deter aggression by Saddam against his neighbors.
Once again, there is an attempt to sugar-coat the issue. In this statement, Clinton adds to the list of vital interests stability, terrorism, and peace. Keep in mind however that the reason America has an interest in peace and stability in the Middle East, which "terrorism" threatens is because of our vital oil interests in the region. It is not difficult to see that it would be impractical and simply impossible for the United States to intervene militarily every time there exists terrorism, instabililty, and/or a lack of peace anywhere in the world. It can only be concluded therefore that the determining factor is that which was also acknowledged by Clinton and his predecessors: oil.
Clinton's "National Security Strategy for a New Century." (As you read these excerpts, keep in mind that this was published in January of 2000 - the last year of his Presidency and the year George W Bush was elected):
Providing for Energy Security
The United States depends on oil for about 40 percent of its primary energy needs, and roughly half of our oil needs are met with imports. And although we import less than 15% of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, our allies in Europe and Japan account for about 80% of those exports. The United States is undergoing a fundamental shift away from reliance on Middle East oil. Venezuela is our number one foreign supplier, and Africa supplies 15% of our imported oil. Canada, Mexico and Venezuela combined supply almost twice as much oil to the United States as the Arab OPEC countries. The Caspian Basin, with potential oil reserves of 160 billion barrels, promises to play an increasingly important role in meeting rising world energy demand in coming decades.
Although Bill Clinton describes a break away from Middle Eastern oil, he later in the same document explains why the Middle East will always be of strategic importance to the United States even if it does not personally need its oil:
Although the United States imports less than 15% of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, the region will remain of vital strategic importance to U.S. national security due to the global nature of the international oil market. Previous oil shocks and the Gulf War underscore that any blockage of Gulf supplies or a substantial increase in price would immediately affect the international market, driving up energy costs everywhere -- ultimately harming the U.S. economy as well as the economies of our key economic partners in Europe and Japan. Appropriate responses to events such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can limit the magnitude of a crisis in the Gulf and its impact on world oil markets. Over the longer term, U.S. dependence on access to these and other foreign oil sources will remain important as our reserves are depleted. That is one of many important reasons why the United States must continue to demonstrate commitment and resolve in the Persian Gulf.
Clinton goes on to admit that the US will always have an interest in foreign oil producing regions, even should we achieve energy independence, suggesting (as do the previous quotes) that the US has interests in controlling the oil market rather than just having access to it ourselves:
Conservation and energy research notwithstanding, the United States will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to foreign oil sources. We must continue to be mindful of the need for regional stability and security in key producing areas to ensure our access to, and the free flow of, these resources.
Notice that Clinton acknowledges in the above quote that our interest in maintaining regional stability and security is to, "ensure our access to, and the free flow of, [oil]." Further on in the document, Clinton continues to explain America's policy toward Saddam Hussein and Iraq:
In Southwest Asia [the Middle East], the United States remains focused on deterring threats to regional stability and energy security, countering threats posed by WMD, and protecting the security of our regional partners, particularly from the threats posed by Iraq and Iran... We will maintain an appropriate military presence in Southwest Asia using a combination of ground, air and naval forces. We maintain a continuous military presence in the Gulf to enhance regional stability and support our on-going efforts to bring Iraq into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. Our forces in the Gulf are backed by our ability to rapidly reinforce the region in time of crisis, which we have demonstrated convincingly... Our policy toward Iraq is comprised of three central elements: containment and economic sanctions, to prevent Saddam from again threatening the stability of the vital Gulf region; relief for the Iraqi people from humanitarian suffering via the UN oil-for-food program; (consider the irony in that last statement in light of the horrible level of human suffering that our sanctions were causing in Iraq. See "Paying the Price for the Gulf War") and support to those Iraqis seeking to replace Saddam's regime with a government that can live at peace with its neighbors and its people. Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 successfully degraded the threat posed by Iraqi WMD in the wake of Baghdad's decision to cease cooperation with UN weapons inspectors... We have consistently maintained that the Iraqi regime can only have sanctions lifted when it has met its obligations to the international community. Saddam's actions over the past decade make clear that his regime will not comply with its obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions designed to rid Iraq of WMD and their delivery systems. Because of that and because the Iraqi people will never be free under the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, we actively support those who seek to bring a new democratic government to power in Baghdad. We recognize that this may be a slow and difficult process, but we believe it is the only solution to the problem of Saddam's regime.
Perhaps of most importance from this last quote is Clinton's acknowledgement of the desire to dispose of Saddam Hussein.
Before we move on to George W. Bush, let's further establish the intent of the United States to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein for the purpose of protecting oil interests, a view that was shared by many in Washington, especially by those who would later form the core of the Bush administration.
The Project for the New American Century
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC, pronounced "P-nack") was formed in 1997 by many former George H.W. Bush administration officials and other influential leaders in Washington. PNAC serves as a "think tank" to influence U.S. policy using issue briefs, articles, letters, reports, and so on. Many of these same men later became part of the current Bush Administration. Among the members of PNAC were Vice President Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, former Chief of Staff and the Vice President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Lewis "Scooter" Libby, and many other Bush administration officials. Needless to say, the political ideology of PNAC created the political ideology of the Bush administration; the Bush administration was essentially made up of PNAC. These men, known as the "neoconservatives", promoted the most aggressive US foreign policy to date. Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby authored the Defense Planning Guide in 1992 that was the foundation of the "Wolfowitz doctrine." The document was leaked to the New York Times, and while there is much information of notable value, we will cite only that which pertains to the Middle East. It is important to know that Paul Wolfowitz would later be considered perhaps the strongest voice in support of the 2003 invasion of Iraq:
Middle East and Southwest Asia
In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.
The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance was consistent with the foreign policies of Carter, Reagan, Bush and the next president, Clinton: 1) all sought to maintain exclusive control of the Persian Gulf, fending off outside threats (USSR) 2) all sought to maintain internal control of the region, not allowing an alliance of power (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) and 3) all sought to deter instability although US involvement has always led to greater instability, giving us an ever increasing excuse to maintain a military presence.
The fundamental idea behind the Wolfowitz Doctrine and the Defense Planning Guidance document was to maintain America's position as the sole-superpower in the post-Cold War world. This would later be reflected in PNAC. From the "About us" section of their website:
Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century [PNAC] is a nonprofit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership.
In their "Statement of Principles," PNAC asserts that the US must maintain:
...a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.
Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests.
The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire.
Many people are unaware that removing Saddam Hussein from power had long been the government's goal. How aggressively to go about it was the focus of debate, not whether or not it should be done. Early in 1998, before his State of the Union address, PNAC wrote a letter to Bill Clinton urging him to take advantage of the opportunity,
to enunciate a new strategy that would secure the interests of the U.S. and our friends and allies around the world. That strategy should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. We stand ready to offer our full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor...
Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East. It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard.
...this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.
We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.
It is important to note that the reason for disposing of Saddam Hussein was to protect our vital interests: oil. The letter is signed by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Robert Zoellick among others. Although Clinton did not enunciate a strategy to remove Saddam Hussein from power in his State of the Union address that year, he did rouse fear toward Iraq by using blatant lies to fuel the flames of the WMD scare regarding Iraq by saying:
Together, we also must also confront the new hazards of chemical and biological weapons, and the outlaw states, terrorists and organized criminals seeking to acquire them. Saddam Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons -- and the missiles to deliver them. The United Nations weapons inspectors have done a truly remarkable job, finding and destroying more of Iraq's arsenal than was destroyed during the entire Gulf War. Now Saddam Hussein wants to stop them from completing their mission.
I know I speak for everyone in this chamber, Republicans and Democrats, when I say to Saddam Hussein: You cannot defy the will of the world. (Applause.) And when I say to him: You have used weapons of mass destruction before; we are determined to deny you the capacity to use them again. (Applause.)
Later that year Clinton would bomb Iraq for the third time in his term. Dissatisfied by Clinton's performance, PNAC wrote a follow-up letter - also signed by Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and Zoellick - to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority leader requesting that they adopt the proposed policy regarding Saddam Hussein that Clinton apparently had not.
On January 26, we sent a letter to President Clinton expressing our concern that the U.S. policy of "containment" of Saddam Hussein was failing. The result, we argued, would be that the vital interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East would soon be facing a threat as severe as any we had known since the end of the Cold War...
We should establish and maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the region, and be prepared to use that force to protect our vital interests in the Gulf - and, if necessary, to help remove Saddam from power...
Congress should adopt the measures necessary to avoid this impending defeat of vital U.S. interests.
This letter brings up a very important factor in PNAC's policy that was not addressed in the letter to Clinton, namely their desire to, "establish and maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the region... to protect our vital interests in the Gulf." This would be seen in greater detail in a PNAC report published two months before the election of George W. Bush.
Rebuilding America's Defenses
One of PNACs most well-known publications is a report called "Rebuilding America's Defenses" published in September 2000. This report, based on the neoconservative imperial principles already cited, serves as an outline for a substantial transformation of American military in order to maintain America's position as the Sole-superpower in the world. Accomplishing this would require a permanent allocation of US troops in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. This document acknowledges the fact that the US had for decades sought a greater military presence in the Middle East. The article also points out that the benefits of having a military presence transcends the "conflict" with Saddam Hussein and the current tension with Iran and points out that while those conflicts provided "justification" for military action, the ultimate goal would be to establish a permanent military presence to protect our "enduring American interests in the region", or oil. Lastly, they point out that this transformation is likely to be a long process unless there is, "some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.":
REBUILDING AMERICA'S DEFENSES
Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century
A Report of The Project for the New American Century
September 2000
[The] Clinton Administration has continued the fiction that the operations of American forces in the Persian Gulf are merely temporary duties. Nearly a decade after the Gulf War, U.S. air, ground and naval forces continue to protect enduring American interests in the region. In addition to rotational naval forces, the Army maintains what amounts to an armored brigade in Kuwait for nine months of every year; the Air Force has two composite air wings in constant "no-fly zone" operations over northern and southern Iraq. And despite increasing worries about the rise of China and instability in Southeast Asia, U.S. forces are found almost exclusively in Northeast Asian bases…
In sum, the 1990s have been a "decade of defense neglect." This leaves the next president of the United States with an enormous challenge: he must increase military spending to preserve American geopolitical leadership, or he must pull back from the security commitments that are the measure of America's position as the world's sole superpower and the final guarantee of security, democratic freedoms and individual political rights. This choice will be among the first to confront the president: new legislation requires the incoming administration to fashion a national security strategy within six months of assuming office, as opposed to waiting a full year, and to complete another quadrennial defense review three months after that. In a larger sense, the new president will choose whether today's "unipolar moment," to use columnist Charles Krauthammer's phrase for America's current geopolitical preeminence, will be extended along with the peace and prosperity that it provides… Thus, facing up to the realities of multiple constabulary missions will require a permanent allocation of U.S. armed forces.
Nor can the problem be solved by simply withdrawing from current constabulary missions or by vowing to avoid them in the future. Indeed, withdrawing from today's ongoing missions would be problematic. Although the no-fly-zone air operations over northern and southern Iraq have continued without pause for almost a decade, they remain an essential element in U.S. strategy and force posture in the Persian Gulf region. Ending these operations would hand Saddam Hussein an important victory, something any American leader would be loath to do…
In the Persian Gulf region, the presence of American forces, along with British and French units, has become a semi-permanent fact of life. Though the immediate mission of those forces is to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, they represent the long-term commitment of the United States and its major allies to a region of vital importance. Indeed, the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein
Notice that PNAC stated that achieving the amount of military transformation that they sought and establishing the level of military presence in the Middle East required an issue greater than the problems posed by Saddam Hussein. Terrorism would later provide that transcendent issue.
The continuing challenges from Iraq also make it unwise to draw down forces in the Gulf dramatically. Securing the American perimeter today – and tomorrow – will necessitate shifts in U.S. overseas operations…
After eight years of no-fly-zone operations, there is little reason to anticipate that the U.S. air presence in the region should diminish significantly as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Although Saudi domestic sensibilities demand that the forces based in the Kingdom nominally remain rotational forces, it has become apparent that this is now a semi-permanent mission. From an American perspective, the value of such bases would endure even should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term, Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And even should U.S.-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward-based forces in the region would still be an essential element in U.S. security strategy given the longstanding American interests in the region.
A point of particular interest here is the degree of importance that PNAC gives to permanent bases in the Middle East. Even if Saddam Hussein were to be replaced with a more agreeable leader in Iraq and even should US-Iranian relation improve, such bases would be essential, "given the longstanding American interests in the region," - oil.
In addition to the aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone, the United States now also retains what amounts to a near-permanent land force presence in Kuwait…
With the rationalization of ground-based U.S. air forces in the region, the demand for carrier presence in the region can be relaxed. As recent strikes against Iraq demonstrate, the preferred weapon for punitive raids is the cruise missile, supplemented by stealthy strike aircraft and longer-range Air Force strike aircraft. Carrier aircraft are most useful in sustaining a campaign begun with missiles and stealth strike aircraft, indicating that a surface action group capable of launching several hundred cruise missiles is the most valuable naval presence in the Gulf. With a substantial permanent Army ground presence in Kuwait, the demands for Marine presence in the Gulf could be scaled back as well…
At the same time, the Army's role in post-Cold-War military operations remains the measure of American geopolitical commitment. In the 1991 Gulf War, the limits of Bush Administration policy were revealed by the reluctance to engage in land combat and the limit on ground operations within the Kuwait theater…
In short, the value of land power continues to appeal to a global superpower, whose security interests rest upon maintaining and expanding a world-wide system of alliances as well as on the ability to win wars. While maintaining its combat role, the U.S. Army has acquired new missions in the past decade – most immediately, missions associated with completing the task of creating a Europe "whole and free" and defending American interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East.
The Air Force presence in the Gulf region is a vital one for U.S. military strategy, and the United States should consider it a de facto permanent presence, even as it seeks ways to lessen Saudi, Kuwaiti and regional concerns about U.S. presence…
In Europe, the Persian Gulf and East Asia, enduring U.S. security interests argue forcefully for an enduring American military presence…
After the victories of the past century – two world wars, the Cold War and most recently the Gulf War – the United States finds itself as the uniquely powerful leader of a coalition of free and prosperous states that faces no immediate great-power challenge.
The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable and durable. It has, over the past decade, provided the geopolitical framework for widespread economic growth and the spread of American principles of liberty and democracy. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time; even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself…
CREATING TOMORROW'S DOMINANT FORCE…
Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.
On September 11, 2001, the neoconservatives got their "catalyzing and catastrophic event." Subsequently, the "War on Terror" has been used as a rallying cry to execute precisely what they had already planned. Saddam Hussein was overthrown, we have set up multiple permanent military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for the last few years Iran has been blacklisted and increasingly condemned just as Iraq was previous to its invasion. PNAC prophetically stated, "Iran may well prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has." Many predict that Israel will strike Iran before the end of the year and the US would without question get involved in the conflict. With the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, we already have Iran surrounded on two sides, with troops stationed on the borders.
Is it possible that after almost a century of military intervention in the Middle East driven by our oil interests in the region that our reason for intervening under George W. Bush would be any different? Especially when his very administration had been calling, for years, for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power because of his threat to our oil interests?
George W. Bush
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan stated in his book The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, "I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil." Because of the aggressiveness of the nature of the Iraq war - the United State's first acknowledged pre-emptive strike - the word "oil" has virtually disappeared from the president's vocabulary as it relates to the Iraq War. It is now only referred to as a "natural resource," a "national interest," "vital interest," "economic interest," etc. Still, even in George W. Bush's own words one can see the perpetuation of the long-established American Middle Eastern foreign policy. In a document published in 2005 called the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" the Bush administration outlined the benefits of victory and the negative consequences of failure in Iraq:
THE BENEFITS OF VICTORY IN IRAQ
Helping the people of Iraq is the morally right thing to do -- America does not abandon its friends in the face of adversity. Helping the people of Iraq, however, is also in our own national interest.
If we and our Iraqi partners prevail in Iraq, we will have made America:
Safer...
- by removing Saddam Hussein, a destabilizing force in a vital region, a ruthless dictator who had a history of pursuing and even using weapons of mass destruction, was a state sponsor of terror, had invaded his neighbors, and who was violently opposed to America;
- by depriving terrorists of a safe haven from which they could plan and launch attacks against the United States and American interests;
- by delivering a strategic setback to the terrorists and keeping them on the run;
- by delivering a decisive blow to the ideology that fuels international terrorism, proving that the power of freedom is stronger than a perverse vision of violence, hatred, and oppression.
Stronger...
- by demonstrating to our friends and enemies the reliability of U.S. power, the strength of our commitment to our friends, and the tenacity of our resolve against our enemies;
- by securing a new friend and partner in the fight against terrorism in the heart of the Middle East.
More Certain of its Future ...
- politically, by bolstering democratic reformers -- and the prospects for peaceful, democratic governments -- in a region that for decades has been a source of instability and stagnation;
- economically, by facilitating progressive reform in the region and depriving terrorists control over a hub of the world's economy.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE
If we and our Iraqi partners fail in Iraq, Iraq will become:
- A safe haven for terrorists as Afghanistan once was, only this time in some of the world's most strategic territory, with vast natural resources to exploit and to use to fund future attacks.
- A country where oppression -- and the brutal imposition of inhumane practices, such as those of the Taliban in Afghanistan -- is pervasive.
- A failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East, with all the attendant risks and incalculable costs for American security and prosperity.
Furthermore, if we and our Iraqi partners fail in Iraq, the terrorists will have:
- Won a decisive victory over the United States, vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide bombings, and ruthless intimidation of civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against Americans and other free people across the globe
- Placed the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region, weakening our friends, and clearing the way for terrorist attacks here at home. The terrorists will be emboldened in their belief that America cannot stand and fight, but will cut and run in the face of adversity.
- Called into question American credibility and commitment in the region and the world. Our friends and foes alike would doubt our staying power, and this would damage our efforts to counter other security threats and to advance other economic and political interests worldwide. (Since 1998, Al Qaida has repeatedly cited Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, as examples to encourage more attacks against America and our interests overseas.)
- Weakened the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in the region -- a historic opportunity, central to America's long-term security, forever lost.
...a free and prosperous Iraq is in the economic interest of everybody, including Iraq's neighbors and the greater Middle East. A flourishing Iraq can spur economic activity and reform in one of the world's most vital regions.
Bush was perhaps more direct when he said:
Our efforts to advance freedom in Iraq are driven by our vital interests and our deepest beliefs.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214-1.html
This year the Department of Defense published the National Defense Strategy which confirms that our foreign policy toward the Middle East and the rest of the world has not changed. It speaks of the continued and in fact increased need to ensure "strategic access" to regions of the world where petroleum is produced and reaffirms the US's policy of transforming the military and increasing our presence in those areas. If the sequence of events after 9/11 was not proof enough, this document demonstrates irrefutably that PNAC's plans have become US policy:
Secure U.S. strategic access and retain freedom of action
The United States requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access to important regions of the world to meet our national security needs. The well-being of the global economy is contingent on ready access to energy resources. Notwithstanding national efforts to reduce dependence on oil, current trends indicate an increasing reliance on petroleum products from areas of instability in the coming years, not reduced reliance. The United States will continue to foster access to and flow of energy resources vital to the world economy...
We will continue to transform overseas U.S. military presence through global defense posture realignment, leveraging a more agile continental U.S. (CONUS)-based expeditionary total force and further developing a more relevant and flexible forward network of capabilities and arrangements with allies and partners to ensure strategic access.
The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars were nothing more than an opportunity to dispose of unwanted leaders and set up a strategic military presence in the Middle East to perpetuate US control over the world's largest region of petroleum production. American foreign policy in the Middle East is the same today as it has been for decades.
Iran
Our analysis of the Iraq War would be incomplete without looking forward to Iran. It is appalling and inexcusable that the American public has succumbed to the exact kind of propaganda regarding Iran that it did regarding Iraq 6 years ago. President Ahmadinejad is viewed by most Americans as an "evil dictator" who threatens world peace and is actively pursuing the capability to produce nuclear warheads to attack Israel and the West. For Americans, most world issues have simply been reduced to a "we're good, they're bad," attitude.
Background
Tensions between the West and Iran climaxed in the mid 1900's when the democratically elected President of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq, nationalized the country's oil production in 1951 (To nationalize a resource is to bring it under the ownership or control of that nation). In consequence, British investors lost their oil concessions that they had won after World War II. Under the guise of protecting Iran from monarchial takeover and communistic threat, the United States secured the West's oil interests in Iran through a secretly executed military coup as can be seen in the Library of Congress Country Studies report on Iran:
The administration of President Harry S Truman initially had been sympathetic to Iran's nationalist aspirations. Under the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, the United States came to accept the view of the British government that no reasonable compromise with Mossadeq was possible and that, by working with the Tudeh, Mossadeq was making probable a communist-inspired takeover. Mossadeq's intransigence and inclination to accept Tudeh support, the Cold War atmosphere, and the fear of Soviet influence in Iran also shaped United States thinking. In June 1953, the Eisenhower administration approved a British proposal for a joint Anglo-American operation, code-named Operation Ajax, to overthrow Mossadeq. Kermit Roosevelt of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) traveled secretly to Iran to coordinate plans with the shah and the Iranian military, which was led by General Fazlollah Zahedi.
In accord with the plan, on August 13 the shah appointed Zahedi prime minister to replace Mossadeq. Mossadeq refused to step down and arrested the shah's emissary. This triggered the second stage of Operation Ajax, which called for a military coup. The plan initially seemed to have failed, the shah fled the country, and Zahedi went into hiding. After four days of rioting, however, the tide turned. On August 19, pro-shah army units and street crowds defeated Mossadeq's forces. The shah returned to the country. Mossadeq was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for trying to overthrow the monarchy, but he was subsequently allowed to remain under house arrest in his village outside Tehran until his death in 1967. His minister of foreign affairs, Hosain Fatemi, was sentenced to death and executed. Hundreds of National Front leaders, Tudeh Party officers, and political activists were arrested; several Tudeh army officers were also sentenced to death.
US and Israeli intelligence subsequently helped set up the Iranian intelligence organization SAVAK which was used to subdue opposition to the dictatorship of the Shah using torture and executions of opposing citizens and Iran suffered under US-backed dictatorial rule until 1979. It can be seen that for the United States, protecting economic interests trumps respect for democracy, freedom, the sovereignty of other nations, and human life. Indeed, the United States has been involved in the overthrow of dozens of governments since WWII for generally the same reason they overthrew Mossadeq's government in Iran - disposing of leaders who support nationalizing resources so that we might have access to those resources ourselves. Literally millions of innocent people have died in the process and countless others left to suffer the consequences of immoral governments and impoverished lifestyles. Considering the reality of the history of US involvement in Iran, it is no wonder that many have negative feelings toward the US and Israel. It would be analogous to China overthrowing our government here in America that we had elected and then setting up a dictatorship to ensure their access to our most abundant resources. Indeed, Iran not only has every right to dislike the United States but to defend itself militarily against us.
Today general American sentiment toward Iran is eerily resemblant of American sentiment toward Iraq previous to the '03 invasion, and for almost exactly the same reasons. Politicians and the media continue to engage in an outpouring of war propaganda claiming that the government of Iran is hostile, supporting terrorism and actively pursuing nuclear weapons. The phrase "wipe Israel off the map" has been falsely attributed to the president of Iran to paint the image of an angry militaristic leader who is often compared to Hitler by many political commentators on various news stations. Just as the WMD scare however, their is little or no evidence for any of America's accusations regarding Iran. We have been fooled as a nation once again by the very same people who deceived us less than a decade ago and we will surely be held accountable for our disastrous and violent negligence.
Also akin to the Iraq conflict, George W. Bush has used protecting our vital interests in the Persian Gulf as a talking point against Iran. In his remarks to Iran in the State of the Union Address in January of this year he said:
Our message to the leaders of Iran is... clear: Verifiably suspend your nuclear enrichment, so negotiations can begin. And to rejoin the community of nations, come clean about your nuclear intentions and past actions, stop your oppression at home, cease your support for terror abroad. But above all, know this: America will confront those who threaten our troops. We will stand by our allies, and we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf. (Applause.)
Just as the overthrow of Mossadeq had more to do with the nationalization of oil than it did with the threat of communism, is it hard to believe that the current war propaganda directed toward Ahmadinejad has more to do with protecting oil than it does with nuclear weapons and fighting terrorism?
It can sometimes be difficult to look truth in the face, especially when that truth seems to contradict everything you have been trained to believe by the government, the media, our education system etc. However difficult though, we must look at the facts and understand them as best we can if we are ever to effect real change. The consequences of not coming to an understanding of the truth are too grave. Recall for a moment the shock, the confusion, the fear, and sadness that was experienced by our country on 9/11 and then consider the death and destruction that has taken place in the Middle East in response. More innocent civilians died in the initial bombings in Afghanistan than died on September 11 - entire villages were eliminated. What is it all for? Who is really paying the price? Even if our foreign policy really were about terrorism, would we be justified? Would it be worth overthrowing governments, destroying communities, and shattering countless lives, innocent lives? Then consider the truth - that it is all based on oil, economic control, and world power.

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Thursday, May 22, 2008

Rumors of Wars

Iraq War: Justification or Rationalization?

On March 19, 2003, US and British forces invaded Iraq. This was a “preemptive” strike, the first in US history. There must have been a really good reason for this unprecedented military action. But, can you remember what the US preempted or prevented from happening? Most people who are supportive of the war believe the war was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power, to confront Muslim extremists head on, and to bring democracy to the Middle East. At times, the Bush administration even made statements linking Iraq to Al-Qaeda and to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in order to justify the use of force, although the administration eventually denied making this connection (see also Rumsfeld saying the US has 'Bulletproof' Evidence of Iraq's links to Al Qaeda.)

In addition, most people today believe the continued US occupation of Iraq is necessary to prevent terrorists from taking over the region—essentially the same argument for why supporters believe we went to war in the first place. However, unlike the initial rationalization for war, this view today is shared by supporters and non-supporters of the war alike including leading Democrats. The only argument now is over how soon the troops should be pulled out, not over whether they should be there in the first place.

It was President Bush who first suggested this new justification for the war in his State of the Union Address, January 23, 2007, to promote public support for the announced 'troop surge' of more than 20,000 additional soldiers:

…Many in this chamber understand that America must not fail in Iraq, because you understand that the consequences of failure would be grievous and far-reaching. If American forces step back before Baghdad is secure, the Iraqi government would be overrun by extremists on all sides. We could expect an epic battle between Shia extremists backed by Iran, and Sunni extremists aided by al Qaeda and supporters of the old regime. A contagion of violence could spill out across the country – and in time, the entire region could be drawn into the conflict. For America, this is a nightmare scenario. For the enemy, this is the objective. Chaos is the greatest ally – their greatest ally in this struggle. And out of chaos in Iraq would emerge an emboldened enemy with new safe havens, new recruits, new resources, and an even greater determination to harm America. To allow this to happen would be to ignore the lessons of September the 11th and invite tragedy. Ladies and gentlemen, nothing is more important at this moment in our history than for America to succeed in the Middle East, to succeed in Iraq and to spare the American people from this danger. (Applause.)

However, contrary to new and old rationalizations for war, the initial 'justification' for the invasion was not the removal of Saddam’s regime, Muslim extremists, or democracy in the Middle East. Rather, the driving argument for war was Saddam’s active pursuit and possession of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons – or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The purpose of the US invasion of Iraq was to forcefully disarm Saddam’s WMD arsenal. Unfortunately, after the invasion, the US found only limited quantities of degraded pre-1991 shells. No WMDs, mobile, or underground production facilities were ever found. (See US stops search for WMDs and UN: Iraq had no WMD after 1994).

The intention of this post is not to persuade you to oppose the war. This post should persuade you, however, that support for the war should only be given in the context of certain historical facts as presented here.

“Turned out to be Wrong”

The following is an excerpt from the President's address to the nation where he admits that the intelligence regarding the existence of WMDs was wrong:

President's Address to the NationVideo
December 18, 2005


"...From this office, nearly three years ago, I announced the start of military operations in Iraq. Our coalition confronted a regime that defied United Nations Security Council resolutions, violated a cease-fire agreement, sponsored terrorism, and possessed, we believed, weapons of mass destruction. After the swift fall of Baghdad, we found mass graves filled by a dictator; we found some capacity to restart programs to produce weapons of mass destruction, but we did not find those weapons.

"It is true that Saddam Hussein had a history of pursuing and using weapons of mass destruction. It is true that he systematically concealed those programs, and blocked the work of U.N. weapons inspectors. It is true that many nations believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. But much of the intelligence turned out to be wrong. As your President, I am responsible for the decision to go into Iraq. Yet it was right to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

"He was given an ultimatum – and he made his choice for war. And the result of that war was to rid a – the world of a murderous dictator who menaced his people, invaded his neighbors, and declared America to be his enemy. Saddam Hussein, captured and jailed, is still the same raging tyrant – only now without a throne. His power to harm a single man, woman, or child is gone forever. And the world is better for it."

When I first came upon this statement, I was very surprised. I had no idea that Bush himself had admitted that the intelligence that supposedly justified our preemptive strike was wrong. Naturally, this sparked a lot of questions in my mind: Is it possible the US would go so far as to invade a country on false intelligence? Don't we have the best intelligence agencies in the world? How can we trust the intelligence community's assessments in the future, especially the new intelligence regarding Iran? Why would the US still pursue this war when the major argument behind it turned out to be false?

Many of these questions will be answered in future posts. This post will highlight some of the many documents and historical information that I studied in order to understand the truth behind the 'weapons crisis' that led to war.

Based on the historical facts you will learn from the information presented in this post, there are only two possible explanations as to why the Bush administration's WMD claims turned out to be wrong, either:

  1. The Bush administration and US intelligence community made gross misjudgments before the war began,
  2. Or, the Bush administration took an active role in exaggerating the nature, strength, and very existence of intelligence.
While both of these explanations are theoretically plausible, the first, as you will see, cannot withstand scrutiny. As you examine the information presented in this post, it should become clear to you that the US intentionally misled the public in order to rally support to go to war. Understanding this is essential before we can answer any other questions surrounding the war.

A WMD History Lesson

(Right: Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam HusseinVideo)

We tend to think of the Iraq War in terms of a timeline from September 11th to the present. However, to really understand the invasion of Iraq, one must first understand the history of US-Iraq relations. During the 1980's the US supported Saddam and supplied his military with many of the weapons we would later condemn. In addition to weapons, we also gave Saddam funding to fight against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. At that time, Iraq's 'use' of chemical warfare was not a concern to the US because we supported the defeat of Iran.

In 1990 and 1991 however, after Saddam used his military power to invade Kuwait—something against US interests—the US fought against Iraq in the Gulf War. Following this conflict, the UN passed many resolutions regarding Iraq, including resolution 687 which required Iraq to destroy all WMDs as well as their capability to produce them.

In conjunction with these resolutions, UN weapons inspectors were to have free access to Iraq. Over the next 7 years, UN inspectors oversaw the destruction of WMDs but were critical of Iraq's level of cooperation. In 1998, Bill Clinton approved air strikes against Iraq known as Operation Desert Fox in which the US and UK bombed many targets throughout Iraq. (See also Operation Desert Strike – 1996, and Operation Southern Watch 1993). In anticipation of the 1998 air strikes, UN inspectors left and were not "kicked out" as Bush later alleged in his 2002 "axis of evil" speech. After having 100 targets bombed, Iraq refused to allow UN inspectors back into the country to inspect their remaining weapons capabilities.

A War of Words: Bush, Cheney, Powell, Rice, and Rumsfeld

After President Bush was elected, members of his administration, including Condeleeza Rice and Colin Powell, affirmed in 2001 that Iraq had no WMDs and that Saddam Hussein was not a threat. These statements, which were true, were in stark contrast to the flood of statements purporting the existence of WMDs unleashed on the American public by the the Bush administration less than a year later.

The "War on Terror" shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq after George W. Bush gave his State of the Union address in January, 2002, when he described the "axis of evil.” These remarks were the first in a year long propaganda campaign that eventually led to the Invasion of Iraq. As the time for war drew closer, the administration became increasingly relentless in their claims that Iraq possessed and refused to disarm WMDs, although many politicians and persons in the media were increasingly skeptical.

I will give just four examples (from hundreds) of the administration's statements:

Dick Cheney – March 24, 2002: "This is a man of great evil, as the President has said. And he is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time. And we think that’s cause for concern for us and for everybody in the region."

Donald Rumsfeld – September 26, 2002: "We know they have weapons of mass destruction. We know they have active programs. There isn’t any debate about it. So the idea that if you had an appropriate inspection regime, that they’d come back and say you were wrong, is so far beyond anyone’s imagination, that it’s not something I think about."

Colin Powell – February 5, 2003: "One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents."

George W. Bush – February 6, 2003: "Iraq has developed spray devices that could be used on unmanned aerial vehicles, with ranges far beyond what is permitted by the Security Council. A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland.

"And we have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons, the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have."

The claims made in these statements, along with hundreds of documented others, never materialized. Much of the world and the US population mistrusted the Bush administration's claims that Saddam was hiding a massive weapons arsenal. Yet, the US ignored the skeptics and went to war using insufficient intelligence. This point is very important to realize. Any of us who lived through that time can remember the heated debate over whether WMDs existed. The Bush administration's bold assertions were often made to counter intense skepticism regarding the US’s true intentions for invading. Hence, it is hard to imagine the administration didn't know exactly what they were doing when making statements that, "turned out to be wrong." This isn't about "turning out to be wrong," as Bush has claimed. This is about being wrong, and promoting wrong intelligence, from the very beginning, knowingly. (See Scott Ritter, former chief UN weapons inspector (1991 -1998), speak out about the US's true intentions prior to the invasion.)

(Please see an excellent documentary called Leading to War that chronicles the build-up of the war using only video clips of statements made by the Bush administration; or read a transcript of the documentary.)

What's worse, and unbeknownst to most American's, during the three months of UN weapons inspections prior to the invasion, Iraq was complying with weapons inspectors more than ever before.

Resolution 1441—One last ‘chance’

Towards the end of 2002, Iraq's government agreed to allow UN weapons inspectors back into the country and the US, and the UK made a push to pass UN resolution 1441. This resolution alleged that Iraq was still in violation of the earlier mentioned Resolution 687 that required Iraq to destroy its WMDs following the Gulf War. This new resolution (1441) required Iraq to comply "immediately, unconditionally and actively," with every term of the resolution, giving Iraq its final chance to destroy its WMDs before having to face "serious consequences.”

Progress and Cooperation

Weapons Inspectors entered Iraq for the first time in 4 years on November 27, 2002. On March 7, 2003, after only three months of inspections, Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix reported substantial progress and cooperation in Iraq:

"Inspections in Iraq resumed on the 27th of November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties, and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM [U.N. Special Commission] in the period 1991 to 1998." He stated that, "The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. It has not, however, so far persisted in this or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it."

After three months, UN inspectors received a level of cooperation from Iraq never reached during the entire decade after the gulf war. Keep in mind, this progress was reported two weeks before the US invaded.
A Substantial Measure of Disarmament
Blix went on to point out specific areas of progress made over the three month period, including the destruction of 96 missiles that exceeded the 150 km range allowed by UN resolutions:
"While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council. The calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision.
"The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament, indeed the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks; lethal weapons are being destroyed."
The destruction of the Al Samoud 2 missiles was one of the outstanding (incomplete) objectives of the Operation Desert Fox airstrike in 1998. In Blix’s words, this was 'the most substantial measure of disarmament...since the middle of the 1990's.’
According to the Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the US regarding WMDs, the Intelligence regarding the existence of the Al Samoud 2 missiles was the only intelligence the US ended up being right about prior to invading. All of the WMD intelligence was wrong. Is it merely coincidence that the US invaded after significantly weakening Saddam's actual weapons capabilities? (See BBC news report the destruction of the Al Samoud 2 missiles.)
The ‘official’ objective of the 2003 invasion and the ‘official’ objective of Operation Desert Fox were one in the same, the disarmament of Iraq’s WMDs by military force. However, half of the targeted sites by Operation Desert Fox were the known sleeping quarters of Saddam and his regime. Only 13 of the 100 targeted sites were associated with chemical warfare, biological warfare, and ballistic missiles. Apparently, the real objective of Operation Desert Fox was the elimination of Saddam's regime.
In 2003, US troops would invade and remove Saddam’s regime, completing what was the US’s real objective all along. As the convenient timing of the invasion indicates, the 2003 invasion was also primarily concerned with the removal of Saddam's regime, not the disarmament of WMDs.
Remaining Tasks
Despite the notable progress and increased cooperation, Blix acknowledged that remaining tasks needed to be completed and said:
"How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can – cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament, and at any rate verification of it, cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude induced by continued outside pressure, it will still take some time to verify sites and items, analyze documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions. It will not take years, nor weeks, but months.
"Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programs."
Here, UN weapons inspectors gave a short timeline of what the US could anticipate going forward. After over a decade of conflict, based on the current Iraqi cooperation, verification of disarmament was to take months, and a remaining monitoring system would ensure our continued safety.
Where were the WMDs according to US intelligence? Underground and Mobile...Of Course.
In addition to reporting substantial progress and cooperation, Blix went on to emphasize that, contrary to US intelligence estimates, UN inspectors had found no evidence of mobile or underground weapons facilities:
Mobile facilities:
"...intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks, in particular that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist.
"Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food-testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen as well as large containers with seed-processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation."
Underground facilities:
"...There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of weapons of mass destruction.
"During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground-penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far."
Absent for 4 Years
Towards the end of his report, Blix explained that a draft working document was to be submitted to the UN Security Council for approval the same month. The document addressed "unresolved disarmament issues," and identified "key remaining disarmament tasks." Notice what Blix said about the amount of information contained in the working document for the period between 1998 and 2003:
"...I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998, including information which has come to light after '98. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity [scarcity] of information.
Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programs have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programs and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document does contain suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled."
Because weapons inspectors were absent 4 years, they could not confidently say whether mobile or underground facilities existed. When UN weapons inspector's demanded to see US intelligence evidencing the existence of those facilities, the US refused to reveal that intelligence. The WMDs were exactly where the US wanted them, underground and mobile, so that no one in the international community, including UN weapons inspectors could determine whether WMDs actually existed. In reality, if the US had waited to invade, the UN would have confirmed to the world that the WMDs and mobile and underground weapons facilities did not exist.
Nuclear Weapons Programs
A week later (just four days before the invasion), intelligence documents the US had claimed were 'strong evidence' of Iraq's nuclear weapons programs were dismissed by the UN as forgeries. However, the question has never been answered as to who forged these documents originally identified by the US as such 'strong evidence.' According to a CNN article, "experts said the suspects include the intelligence services of Iraq's neighbors, other pro-war nations, Iraqi opposition groups or simply con men. Most rule out the United States, Great Britain or Israel because they said those countries' intelligence services would have been able to make much more convincing forgeries if they had chosen to do so. President Bush even highlighted the documents in his State of the Union address on January 28." (See Fake Iraq documents 'embarrassing' for US).
A year after the invasion, Hans Blix accused the US and UK of dramatizing the threat of WMDs in order to strengthen the case for the war in an interview with the BBC. (See also Hans Blix questioned the way Tony Blair and George Bush managed intelligence prior to the invasion and Former chief UN weapons inspector Dr Hans Blix: "The intelligence was not so strong").
Manipulating the Reported Progess
The Bush administration countered the progress reported on March 7, 2002, by repeating the claim to the American public that our intelligence indicated that Saddam was using mobile and underground weapons facilities to hide his WMD programs.
Such an opposite and defiant reaction from the administration to reported progress from weapons inspectors was foreseeable. Months before the inspections began, the Bush administration had hedged against the possibility of reported progress and cooperation from Iraq. In August 2002, three months before inspections, Cheney had voiced his disapproval of inspectors entering Iraq altogether, claiming that inspections would only be detrimental by giving a false sense of security:
"A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his [Saddam's] compliance with the UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box."
If the US was so sure of the existence of WMDs, why would Cheney be worried that that inspectors would not find them, months before inspections began?
Enter Bush and Powell
In addition to the administration's attempt to counter the possibility of reported cooperation and progress months before inspections began, on the same day Hans Blix reported, Colin Powell was also prepared to ward off the reported progress before the UN. According to Powell, the progress and cooperation reported by weapons inspectors fell short. After all under resolution 1441, Iraq had to comply “immediately, unconditionally and actively” or else face "serious consequences.” He also continued to assert that he “knew” underground and mobile facilities existed:
UNITED NATIONS WEAPONS INSPECTORS REPORT
TO SECURITY COUNCIL ON PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT OF IRAQ
…[Colin Powell] said today’s meeting concerned a very, very important question, namely, whether the Iraqi leadership had made the decision to comply with Security Council resolutions and to rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction and infrastructure for such weapons. The answer was not about how many inspectors were on the ground, or how much more time and effort should be given, nor whether more benchmarks were needed. The answer depended on whether Iraq had made the choice to actively cooperate in every possible manner in the immediate and complete disarmament of its prohibited weapons.
Today’s briefings had shed more light on that difficult question, he said. He had listened very carefully to hear if Iraq had finally understood that the will of the international community must be obeyed. He was pleased to hear some new progress and activity with respect to substance, but he was sorry that that was all still coming in a grudging manner and that Iraq was still refusing to offer immediate, active and unconditional cooperation – not late, but immediate, not passive, but active, and not conditional, but unconditional in every respect. Despite some progress, he still found a catalogue of non-cooperation. If Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, he would not have to worry about setting up the means to look for mobile biological units, and search extensively for the underground facilities he knew existed
“I Cannot Tell a Lie” ~George Washington
Unfortunately, the next day, President Bush misled the public with regard to the reported progress and cooperation in a radio address, leading the unquestioning public to believe that the March 7 report by UN weapons inspectors actually concluded that Iraq did in fact have WMDs:
March 8, 2003
President Bush: The Chief United Nations Weapons Inspector reported yesterday to the Security Council on his efforts to verify Saddam Hussein's compliance with Resolution 1441. This resolution requires Iraq to fully and unconditionally disarm itself of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons materials, as well as the prohibited missiles that could be used to deliver them. Unfortunately, it is clear that Saddam Hussein is still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm. (Notice how this last statement appears to be the UN inspector's conclustion but nothing could be further from the truth.)
our intelligence shows that even as he is destroying these few missiles, he has ordered the continued production of the very same type of missiles…If the Iraqi regime were disarming, we would know it – because we would see it; Iraq's weapons would be presented to inspectors and destroyed. Inspection teams do not need more time, or more personnel – all they need is what they have never received, the full cooperation of the Iraqi regime.
The attacks of September the 11, 2001 showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terror states could do with weapons of mass destruction. We are determined to confront threats wherever they arise. And, as a last resort, we must be willing to use military force. We are doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq. But if Saddam Hussein does not disarm peacefully, he will be disarmed by force.
Military Force…One way or another
Based on the logic Powell and Bush use, it is clear the use of military force never hinged on proof of the existence of WMDs. After all, the administration already ‘knew’ Saddam had WMDs—they didn’t need proof from the UN. No, the invasion hinged on whether Saddam complied with every term of resolution 1441, “immediately, unconditionally and actively,” as Colin Powell emphasized in his retort to Hans Blix's report.
Rather than grant the few months requested by weapons inspectors to complete the UN inspection, the US and UK took action. Incredibly, on the same day of Hans Blix report, the US, UK, and Spain presented a drafted UN Security Council resolution that said:
"Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under resolution 1441 and previous relevant resolutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC and the IAEA of all weapons, weapon delivery and support systems and structures, prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior destruction of such items."
If passed, the resolution would have given UN authorization to carry out the "serious consequences" warned of in resolution 1441—the use of military force. However, after facing opposition in the UN from other countries, the US, UK, and Spain abandoned their efforts to pass this new resolution. Instead, the administration invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, under authorization they had received in October, 2002 when congress circumvented the Constitution by granting power to the President to use military power to disarm Iraq, without officially declaring war. Reminiscent of Viet Nam, congress has never actually declared war on Iraq.
Hindsight is 20/20
After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and that Saddam ended the country's nuclear program after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The Iraq Survey Group also concluded that UN inspectors were in the process of confirming these facts before the invasion. Bush's continued defense of the war, regardless of these findings, only makes sense when you realize the US never cared whether WMDs existed.
History Rewritten
The buildup to the war using false intelligence is consistently explained away by the media and politicians as a "mistake" or "intelligence failure" and the responsibility of the Bush administration is left out of the equation. Today, no one ever explores the possibility that the Bush administration distorted the facts in order to scare the public and fuel support for the invasion. At worst, the administration's culpability is explained away as a willingness to "rush to war."
The “Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assesments on Iraq” is an example of an attempt to cast the blame on the intelligence community and away from the Bush administration:
Ordered Reported on July 7, 2004
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
Overall Conclusions - Weapons of Mass Destruction
Conclusion 1. Most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence...
Conclusion 2. The Intelligence Community did not accurately or adequately explain to policymakers the uncertainties behind the judgments in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate…
Conclusion 3. The Intelligence Community suffered from a collective presumption that Iraq had an active and growing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. This "group think" dynamic led Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers to both interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program as well as ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have active and expanding weapons of mass destruction programs. This presumption was so strong that formalized Intelligence Community mechanisms established to challenge assumptions and group think were not utilized…
Conclusion 4. In a few significant instances, the analysis in the National Intelligence Estimate suffers from a "layering" effect whereby assessments were built based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties of the underlying judgments…
Conclusion 5. In each instance where the Committee found an analytic or collection failure, it resulted in part from a failure of Intelligence Community managers throughout their leadership chains to adequately supervise the work of their analysts and collectors. They did not encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions, fully consider alternative arguments, accurately characterize the intelligence reporting, or counsel analysts who lost their objectivity…
Conclusion 6. The Committee found significant short-comings in almost every aspect of the Intelligence Community's human intelligence collection efforts against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities, in particular that the Community had no sources collecting against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after 1998. Most, if not all, of these problems stem from a broken corporate culture and poor management, and will not be solved by additional funding and personnel.
At the time this 2004 report was released, the Senate Committee decided to postpone "phase II" of their investigation: their investigation of how senior policymakers (i.e., the Bush administration) misused intelligence to build a case for war.
Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said, in regard to whether the committee should complete "phase II" of the investigation, "I don't think there should be any doubt that we have now heard it all regarding prewar intelligence. I think that it would be a monumental waste of time to replow this ground any further." (See Senator Roberts remarks on the WMD Comission Report.)
To date, there has been no assessment released regarding the Bush administration's conduct, handling of intelligence, or influence on the intelligence community. The "phase II" report is due to be released June 2008, 5 years after the war began.
How Policymakers used the Intelligence
The US government’s official account of the WMD controversy, authorized by the president, is summarized in a document called the ‘Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the US regarding WMDs’:
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, MARCH 31, 2005
On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the US Intelligence Community. And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over.
While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, in the end it was the United States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most public—and most damaging—intelligence failures in recent American history…
While laudable steps were taken to improve our intelligence agencies after September 11, 2001, the agencies have done less in response to the failures over Iraq, and we believe that many within those agencies do not accept the conclusion that we reached after our year of study: that the Community needs fundamental change if it is to successfully confront the threats of the 21st century…
we were not authorized to investigate how policymakers [the Bush administration] used the intelligence assessments they received from the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, while during the course of our investigation, we interviewed a host of current and former policymakers, the purpose of those interviews was to learn about how the Intelligence Community reached and communicated its judgments about Iraq’s weapons programs—not to review how policymakers subsequently used that information
In October 2002, at the request of members of Congress, the National Intelligence Council produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)—the most authoritative intelligence assessment produced by the Intelligence Community— which concluded that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program and was actively pursuing a nuclear device. According to the exhaustive study of the Iraq Survey Group, this assessment was almost completely wrong. The NIE said that Iraq’s biological weapons capability was larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War and that Iraq possessed mobile biological weapons production facilities. This was wrong. The NIE further stated that Iraq had renewed production of chemical weapons, including mustard, sarin, GF, and VX, and that it had accumulated chemical stockpiles of between 100 and 500 metric tons. All of this was also wrong. Finally, the NIE concluded that Iraq had unmanned aerial vehicles that were probably intended for the delivery of biological weapons, and ballistic missiles that had ranges greater than the United Nations’ permitted 150 kilometer range. In truth, the aerial vehicles were not for biological weapons; some of Iraq’s missiles were, however, capable of traveling more than 150 kilometers. The Intelligence Community’s Iraq assessments were, in short, riddled with errors.
Notice once again that the only claims that were correct were those regarding the short-range missiles. The incessant criticism of the intelligence community is an obvious effort to remove the blame from the truly culpable parties. In the middle of this statement is the glaring admission that no investigation into how the Bush administration used the intelligence was ever authorized. Then, despite their findings, the report sickeningly seeks not only to submerge, but to perpetuate the scandal by again promoting the WMD scare, claiming that, "no matter how much we improve the Intelligence Community, weapons of mass destruction will continue to pose an enormous threat."
Ironically, the intelligence community had not erred at all, in fact it worked hand in hand with the Bush administration, deceiving the international community and pursuading UN inspectors of the necessity of disarming Iraq before the invasion. In addition to assisting in the WMD deception, our intelligence community even spied on the UN Security Council during this time.
Bugging the UN
A year after the invasion, evidence of a proposed effort to bug UN security council representatives (around the time the US was seeking approval from the council) came to light. A British government translator leaked a document "allegedly from an American National Security Agency" requesting that British intelligence put wiretaps on delegates to the UN security council. So, While US and British intelligence agencies 'failed' to get the intelligence regarding our enemies correct, they, for what ever reason, saw the importance of snooping on our allies. Why was this necessary if they believed so strongly in their evidence of Iraq's WMDs at the time?
Even Hans Blix revealed that he suspected the US had bugged his home and office. Blix's comment on the situation says it all: "It feels like an intrusion into your integrity in a situation when you are actually on the same side."
Conclusion
In conclusion, I agree with Colin Powell that there was no justification for the invasion absent the existence of WMDs. If the invasion was not justified then, as Colin Powell explained, how can the continuation of the war be justifiable now? Freedom, terrorism, and removing Saddam weren't good enough reasons for war from the outset, so how can these reasons be good enough now? The Bush administration would never have garnered enough international or domestic support for a war based on those reasons. (See Scott Ritter, former chief UN weapons inspector (1991 - 1998), summarize the WMD and Iraq war issue.)
It is sometimes difficult to accept information that contradicts what we have held to be true for so long. I, for one, was once very supportive of President Bush. I sought to justify the Iraq War using much of the information that I later learned to be false. However, when I decided to research the war in depth, on my own, the truth about the war was surprisingly clear. I was able to take things in little by little, and to answer many of my own unanswered questions.
Today, it is the natural reaction of almost everyone I present this information to, who supports the war, to question my sources and criticize me for being narrow-minded and for refusing to examine the 'other side' of the issue. What is ironic about these accusations is that primary sources that prove the truth about the war are abundant. After seeing direct contradictions made by the Bush administration as they seek to justify the invasion, where am I supposed to look for credible information in favor of the war? One would have to be unaware of hard historic facts to believe there was still an initial justification for the invasion, or to believe that our government merely made a "mistake” by using the WMD justification. Simply put, to imagine that there was justification for war, or that the Bush administration perhaps didn’t realize the extent to which they were wrong, flies in the face of reason.
To summarize, let's say I were to use my best efforts to make a pro-Iraq War argument. An informed argument would still have to take into account the indisputable facts that:
  • Iraq had no WMDs after all
  • Each of the highest ranking officials in the Bush administration continually spoke of the existence of WMDs as fact
  • Two weeks before the invasion, chief UN weapons inspectors reported that no WMDs, or weapons facilities, including mobile or underground facilities, had been found
  • The US ignored the lack of WMD findings by UN inspectors and misled the public regarding those findings, continuing to emphasize the existence of underground and mobile facilities
  • Two weeks before the invasion, chief UN weapons inspectors reported the highest level of progress and cooperation from Iraq since the Gulf War
  • The US ignored the reports by UN inspectors of Iraqi cooperation and misled the public regarding that reported cooperation
  • The US went to war without a declaration, having never been attacked by Iraq and, to the contrary, after attacking Iraq for decades
  • The intelligence community is consistently blamed for the erroneous WMD claims
Do you see why President Bush changed the 'justification' argument from WMDs to raging tyrants, extremists, and al Queda? Even he knows the 'other side' of the argument is unsubstantiated. Jon and I have many times discussed how we would be happy to support the Iraq War if we could find reasons to do so. Our searches for the truth began by looking for reasons to support the war. After all our research we found only reasons to believe this war is about something very different than WMDs, freedom, terrorists, threats to our country and tyranny.
Please post your comments. We invite any questions, doubts, or additional information regarding this topic.

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